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Eliminating the Subjective Intent Requirement for 
True Threats in United States v. Bagdasarian 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the founding of our nation, freedom of speech has been 
considered a sacrosanct right of citizens, but has never been 
absolute. The Supreme Court has “long recognized that the 
government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent 
with the Constitution.”1 The categories of speech that fall outside of 
the scope of First Amendment protection include “a few limited 
areas, which are ‘of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.’”2 As a result, “true threats,” or 
“threats of physical violence,” are not protected by the First 
Amendment and may be proscribed by government.3 Although this 
rule appears straightforward, courts have found it difficult to 
distinguish between what does and does not constitute a true threat.4 
The fine line between what is a true threat and what is protected 
speech was revisited by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Bagdasarian, in which the court found that a subjective 
intent analysis is required by the First Amendment in determining 
what constitutes a true threat.5 This Note argues that the Ninth 
Circuit erred in finding that a subjective intent analysis must be 
engrafted onto every true threat statute because the rationale for 
proscribing true threats from First Amendment protection originates 
from objective harm to others and not from the subjective intent of 
the individual. Therefore, the Supreme Court should resolve the split 
this decision creates among circuit courts by holding that Virginia v. 
 
 1. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). 
 2. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (quoting Chaplinksy v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
 3. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994); Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). 
 4. Compare Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (holding that “political hyperbole” regarding the 
President of the United States does not constitute a true threat) with R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 
(“[T]he reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment . . . have special force 
when applied to the person of the President.”). 
 5. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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Black does not automatically require a subjective intent analysis to 
determine what constitutes a true threat. 
Part II of this Note discusses the context and procedural 
background of Bagdasarian. Part III reviews the Bagdasarian 
majority opinion, while Part IV reviews the concurring opinion of 
Judge Wardlaw. Part V argues that the court erred in presuming that 
the First Amendment requires a subjective intent analysis to be 
grafted onto all true threat statutes. Part VI concludes this Note. 
II. CONTEXT & BACKGROUND 
On October 22, 2008, Walter Edward Bagdasarian joined a 
“Yahoo! Finance—American International Group” message board, 
where comments are posted by the public regarding “financial 
matters, AIG, and other topics.”6 Under the username 
“californiaradial,” Bagdasarian made a series of comments that were 
racially charged and that encouraged violence.7 
At 1:15 a.m., Bagdasarian posted the first comment for which he 
would later be charged with a crime when he wrote under the 
subject heading “OBAMA,”: “fk the niggar, he will have a 50 cal in 
the head soon”8 (“Bagdasarian’s first statement”). This was followed 
six minutes later by another post under that same heading that 
“combined [Bagdasarian’s] pro-bomb and anti-Obama rhetoric,” by 
writing, “yea, the honest people have NO guns and the scum bags, 
niggars and drug fks do, thanx obombhaaaaa.”9 
At 1:35 a.m., Bagdasarian posted the second threat for which he 
was criminally charged by creating his own subject heading, “shoot 
the nig,” and writing: “country fkd for another 4 years+, what nig 
has done ANYTHING right? ? ? ? long term? ? ? ? never in history . . 
. .” 10 (“Bagdasarian’s second statement”). 
 
 
 6. Id. at 1115. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1124 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 9. Id. Bagdasarian immediately followed these comments with two others that 
“reiterated his racist animus” by referencing Obama’s combination of African and Irish 
heritage. Id. He stated: “full monkey, hey can you crank the music box, I wanna see the 
puppet monkey dance . . . .” Id. Only four minutes later, Bagdasarian reiterated these 
sentiments with this comment: “a lepraaaaaaniggggggggamuch? blank that one, yahoo a-
holes.” Id.   
 10. Id. 
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At this point, several other participants had endured enough of 
Bagdasarian’s crude and violent comments, and a handful of 
participants fired back. “Dan757x” responded to Bagdasarian’s 
Second Statement stating: “You’ve been reported by me, a good ole’ 
white boy.”11 The next post by “Freddie226” said, “I hope everyone 
reports this type of garbage.”12 This was followed by “Sniper1agent” 
commenting, “[b]e advised Federal Law Enforcement is 
monitoring,” and by “Brown.romaine,” who warned: “I am 
reporting this post to the Secret Service.”13 By 8:00 a.m. the next 
morning, Bagdasarian sought to excuse his earlier comments by 
claiming he was drunk.14 
Ultimately, a retired Air Force officer reported californiaradial’s 
threats to the Los Angeles Field Office of the United States Secret 
Service because “he was ‘concerned that the posting threatened 
harm to Barack Obama.’”15 The Secret Service investigated these 
online threats, traced californiaradial’s IP address to Bagdasarian, and 
confronted him at his home on November 21, 2008.16 Bagdasarian 
admitted that he wrote the posts in question under the username 
“californiaradial,” and he also admitted that he had weapons in his 
home.17 While completing a search of Bagdasarian’s home a few days 
later, Secret Service agents discovered “six firearms, including a 
Remington model 700ML .50 caliber muzzle-loading rifle.”18 
Additionally, while searching the hard drive of Bagdasarian’s 
computer, agents discovered two e-mails written by Bagdasarian that 
reiterated his racial prejudice and his violent opposition to Barack 
Obama.19 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1124–25. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1130. 
 15. Id. at 1125. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. One email, written on November 4, 2008, stated: “Pistol??? Dude, Josh needs to 
get us one of these, just shoot the nigga’s car and POOF!” Id.  Included in the email was a 
web-link to a “photograph of a rifle on the Barrett Rifles website.” Id. In the second email, 
written later that same day, Bagdasarian wrote, “Pistol . . . plink plink plink Now when you use 
a 50 cal on a nigga car you get this.” Id. The email then included a link to a “YouTube video 
of a car being blown up.” Id. 
17ROMNEY.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  11:36 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
642 
A. The U.S. District Court’s Findings 
The Secret Service filed a criminal complaint against Bagdasarian, 
and charged him with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 
879(a)(3), which prohibits “threatening to kill and inflict bodily 
harm upon a major candidate for the office of president of the 
United States.”20 After waiving his right to a jury trial, Bagdasarian’s 
case was tried by a United States district judge. Bagdasarian was 
found guilty on both counts by the district court, and appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.21 
III. UNITED STATES V. BAGDASARIAN 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the law in United States v. 
Bagdasarian by recognizing that “the state cannot criminalize 
constitutionally protected speech,” but that “true threats” as a 
category are not protected by the First Amendment.22 Citing to 
Virginia v. Black, the court found that the state can only punish 
threatening expression when the speaker “means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence 
to a particular individual or group of individuals.”23 Based on this 
statement, the court reasoned in dicta that it is “not sufficient that 
objective observers would reasonably perceive such speech as a threat 
of injury or death.”24 Instead, the court found that a subjective 
intent analysis was required in every case to determine whether a 




 20. Id. at 1116 (majority opinion). 
 21. Id. at 1116. 
 22. Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)). Judge Wardlaw 
recognized in the concurring opinion that the burden in this case rested upon the government 
to prove that Bagdasarian made a true threat. Id. at 1124 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(recognizing that the standard of review when “reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction” is to “determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 23. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1116 (majority opinion) (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 359 (2003)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1117. 
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To clear up “perceived confusion”26 about whether a subjective 
or an objective analysis is required by the First Amendment to 
determine “whether a threat is criminal under various threat 
statutes,” the court held that “the subjective test set forth in Black 
must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.”27 
As a result, the court determined that while a subjective intent 
analysis was required in every case, an objective intent analysis was 
required only where a statute called for that inquiry.28 The court also 
determined that, according to its earlier case law, 18 U.S.C. § 
879(a)(3) must be interpreted as requiring “the application of both 
an objective and subjective standard.”29 
The court’s application of both an objective and subjective test 
under 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3) means that the government had the 
burden to prove: (A) that Bagdasarian’s statements “would be 
understood by people hearing or reading [them] in context as a 
serious expression of an intent to kill or injure a major candidate for 
President,” and (B) that Bagdasarian “intended that [each] 
statement be understood as a threat.”30 Ultimately, the court found 
that the government failed to meet its burden of proof under both 
tests. 
A. The Court’s Objective Intent Analysis 
Under the objective analysis, the court considers the important 
questions of “whether a reasonable person who heard the statement 
would have interpreted it as a threat.”31 This inquiry requires that a 
fact-finder fully consider a statement’s context, including “the 
surrounding events, the listener’s reaction, and whether the words 
are conditional.”32 The court must also determine whether the 
defendant’s statements constitute “a serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily harm on or to take the life of [a president 
 
 26. The confusion was more than a matter of perception. The Ninth Circuit previously 
“adopted an objective intent standard for interpreting the requirement that a threat be made 
‘knowingly and willfully.’” Mitchell, 812 F.2d at 1256 (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 
F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969)). 
 27. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1116–17. 
 28. Id. at 1117.  
 29. Id. (citing United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 30. Id. at 1118 (citing Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117). 
 31. Id. at 1119 (citing Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117). 
 32. Id. (quoting Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
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or presidential candidate].”33 Under this objective intent analysis, the 
court determined that there was insufficient evidence for any 
reasonable person to conclude that Bagdasarian’s statements 
“threatened to injure or kill” Barack Obama.34 
In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the following 
factors: (1) the plain meaning of the words used by Bagdasarian;35 
(2) the conditional nature of his statements;36 (3) the fact that 
Bagdasarian’s statements were anonymous;37 (4) the reaction of 
message board members to his statements;38 and (5) the Secret 
Service’s acquisition of additional information about Bagdasarian in 
their investigation.39 
1. The Plain Meaning of the Words Used by Bagdasarian 
The court determined that the plain meaning of the words used 
by Bagdasarian did not constitute a threat.40 Bagdasarian’s first 
statement was interpreted by the court as a mere prediction that did 
not convey a threat.41 Bagdasarian’s second statement was 
interpreted by the court as “an imperative intended to encourage 
others to take violent action” but not as a threat from Bagdasarian.42 
The court concluded that “[i]t is difficult to see how a rational trier 
of fact could reasonably have found that either statement . . . 
expresses a threat against Obama.”43 
2. The Conditional Nature of Bagdasarian’s Statements 
Although the court found that Bagdasarian’s statements were 
“alarming and dangerous” and expressed in unconditional terms, the 
court held that they did not constitute a threat.44 Conditional 
 
 33. Id. (quoting Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1119–20. 
 36. Id. at 1120. 
 37. Id. at 1120–21. 
 38. Id. at 1121. 
 39. Id. at 1115–16, 1121–22. 
 40. Id. at 1119. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1120. 
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statements are much less likely to be construed as true threats.45  
Even though Bagdasarian’s statements were unconditional, the court 
believed that the plain meaning of Bagdasarian’s statements could 
not be reasonably construed as threats.46 
3. The Anonymity of Bagdasarian’s Statements 
Despite recognizing that “in some circumstances a speaker’s 
anonymity could influence a listener’s perception of danger,” the 
court nevertheless determined that the anonymous nature of 
Bagdasarian’s statements did not make them any more likely to be 
considered true threats.47 The court believed that the “non-violent 
[nature of the] discussion forum” where Bagdasarian made his 
statements would “tend to blunt any perception that statements 
made there were serious expressions of intended violence.”48 Thus, 
the anonymous nature of Bagdasarian’s statements under these 
circumstances did not make them any more threatening. 
4. The Forum Readers’ Reaction to Bagdasarian’s Statements 
The court also found that the forum readers’ reaction to 
Bagdasarian’s statements was not decisive in determining whether he 
made true threats. Although the court recognized that four 
discussion board members wrote that they “planned to alert 
authorities” after Bagdasarian’s second statement, the court pointed 
out that only one of them actually did so.49 The court further noted 
though that these readers might have been offended by the racist 
sentiments in Bagdasarian’s statements, they apparently did not 
believe that they were threats.50 Therefore, the fact that people were 
disturbed by Bagdasarian’s statements did not persuade the court 
that “others [necessarily] interpreted them as a threat.”51 
 
         45. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (overturning a conviction of a 
threat to kill Lyndon B. Johnson because the statement was conditional). 
 46. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1120. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1121. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
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5. Additional Information Obtained About Bagdasarian After His 
Statements Were Made 
The court also gave no weight to the fact that Bagdasarian 
personally owned a .50 caliber rifle or that he sent a friend an email 
depicting a car being blown up.52 According to the court, these 
details were unknown to those reading Bagdasarian’s statements and 
could therefore have no bearing on an objective test that considers 
whether Bagdasarian’s statements would have been interpreted as a 
threat “by a reasonable person in the position of those who saw his 
postings on the AIG discussion board.”53 
In sum, the court ultimately concluded that the plain meaning of 
Bagdasarian’s statements did not constitute a threat, and that a 
reasonable, objective person reading his postings in context could 
not have interpreted his statements as a threat against Barack 
Obama.54 
C. The Court’s Subjective Intent Analysis 
After determining that Bagdasarian’s statements did not 
constitute a threat under an objective analysis, the court considered 
Bagdasarian’s statements under a subjective intent analysis and 
determined that Bagdasarian did not intend his statements to convey 
a threat. Under a subjective intent analysis, the government must 
prove that Bagdasarian “made [his] statements intending that they 
be taken as a threat.”55 Otherwise, Bagdasarian’s statements would 
be “afforded constitutional protection.”56 The court interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Black as indicating that the State may 
punish threats only if the “speaker means to communicate a serious 




 52. Id. at 1121–22. 
 53. Id. at 1122. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). In addition, the court looked to its decision in Gordon where it was recognized that 
Congress “construe[d] ‘knowingly and willfully’ [in § 879] as requiring proof of a subjective 
intent to make a threat[.]” Id. (quoting United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (alterations in original). 
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The court’s subjective intent analysis closely paralleled its  
objective intent analysis. First, the court relied on the “predictive” 
and “exhortatory” nature of Bagdasarian’s statements to conclude 
that “the evidence [was] not sufficient for any reasonable finder of 
fact to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Bagdasarian 
intended that his statements be taken as threats.”58 Second, the court 
found that the entire context in which Bagdasarian made his 
comments did not indicate that he intended his statements to be 
taken as a threat. The court distinguished this case from United 
States v. Sutcliffe, where the court affirmed the conviction of the 
defendant under a different threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).59 In 
Sutcliffe, the defendant’s statements were made in the “first-person” 
and were “highly specific” (e.g., “I will kill you”).60 Since 
Bagdasarian’s statements “fail[ed] to express any intent on his part to 
take any action,” the court reasoned that his statements lacked the 
personal declaration and specificity that constitute a true threat.61 
Hence, under both an objective and subjective intent analysis, 
the court concluded that Bagdasarian’s statements were protected by 
the First Amendment because no reasonable interpretation of his 
postings could be seen as a true threat.62 
IV. JUDGE WARDLAW’S CONCURRING OPINION 
Although Judge Wardlaw fully concurred with “the majority’s 
analysis of the law of ‘true threats,’” his objective and subjective 
intent analyses reached the opposite conclusions from the majority 
opinion. Judge Wardlaw ultimately concluded that “there [was] 
sufficient evidence to find Mr. Bagdasarian guilty of threatening” 
Barack Obama.63  
A. Judge Wardlaw’s Objective Intent Analysis 
Under Judge Wardlaw’s analyses of Bagdasarian’s statements, he 
found that there was “sufficient evidence supporting a finding of 
objective intent” to threaten Barack Obama under Jackson v. 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1123 (citing United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 359). 
 63. Id. 
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Virginia.64 Judge Wardlaw argued that the majority of the court 
therefore erred in its objective intent analysis by reading 
Bagdasarian’s statements in isolation and by determining that “they 
were not even threats.”65 Judge Wardlaw emphasized that “threats 
should be considered in light of their entire factual context, 
including the surrounding events and reaction of the listeners.”66 
Wardlaw argued that the court’s analysis failed to consider 
“America’s history of racial violence, the uniquely racial and violent 
undercurrents of the 2008 presidential election,” the entirety of 
Bagdasarian’s statements, and the reaction of those who read 
Bagdasarian’s posts.67 
1. The full context of Bagdasarian’s statements 
Judge Wardlaw noted that Bagdasarian made his statements 
“two weeks before the 2008 election,” at a time “when violent and 
racist threats against candidate Obama were being taken very 
seriously.”68 The 2008 election stirred “polarizing racial animus”69 
that resulted in at least one “viable assassination attempt” against 
Barack Obama.70 Additionally, Judge Wardlaw indicated that the 
majority opinion failed to fully consider that several of those who 
read Bagdasarian’s posts “perceived the posts as threatening when 
they were made” and acted upon their perceptions by replying to 
Bagdasarian directly while one individual contacted government 
authorities.71 
An additional contextual factor that Judge Wardlaw considered 
in his opinion was the growing number of violent shootings that 
have been presaged by internet postings. The 1999 shootings at 
Columbine High School, the 2007 killings at Virginia Tech, and the 
 
 64. Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)). 
 65. Id. at 1125.  
 66. Id. (quoting United States v. Orozco–Santillan, 290 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 
1990)). 
 67. Id. at 1125–26. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1126. 
 70. Id. (citing Dave McKinney, Frank Main & Natasha Korecki, A Plot Targeting 
Obama? 3 in Custody May Be Tied to Supremacists, Said to Talk of Stadium Shooting, CHI. 
SUN–TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008). Judge Wardlaw also points out that concern for the safety of 
Barak Obama led to him receiving Secret Service protection earlier than any of the other 
presidential candidates other than former First Lady Hilary Clinton. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1125–26.  
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more recent shooting of Arizona Representative Gabrielle Giffords 
all occurred after the assailants posted material on the internet that 
revealed their violent feelings.72 According to Judge Wardlaw, the 
public awareness of these tragic events makes it “logical to conclude 
that online postings of impending violence would be perceived by 
reasonable people as serious threats.”73 In light of all of these 
contextual factors, Judge Wardlaw found that there was “sufficient 
evidence for ‘a rational juror’ to find objective intent.”74 
B. Judge Wardlaw’s Subjective Intent Analysis 
Judge Wardlaw agreed with his colleagues that “in every threats 
case the Constitution requires that the subjective test is met.”75 
Unlike his colleagues, Judge Wardlaw concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence to affirm Bagdasarian’s conviction under the 
subjective intent analysis. He emphasized that the government 
needed to demonstrate only that Bagdasarian intended to make a 
threat, not that he planned to carry out the threat.76 As the court 
held in Black: “The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the 
threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats ‘protects individuals 
from the fear of violence,’ . . . in addition to protecting people ‘from 
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.’”77 
Employing this standard, Judge Wardlaw determined that 
Bagdasarian knew “he had access to [a .50 caliber] weapon and 
could implement the threat.”78 Additionally, Bagdasarian’s second 
statement was made with the intent to “threaten harm to candidate 
Obama[, which] generated fear for the candidate’s safety and 
mobilized the Secret Service . . . .”79 Judge Wardlaw argued that 
Bagdasarian’s later excuse that he made his comments while 
intoxicated suggests that several hours after making his comments, 
 
 72. Id. at 1126–27 n.2. 
 73. Id. at 1127. 
 74. Id. at 1129 (quoting United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc)). 
 75. Id. at 1124 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Virginia 
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)). 
 76. Id. at 1130. 
 77. Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 
(1992)). 
 78. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1131 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 79. Id.  
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he realized “the serious nature of his threats.”80 Based upon these 
facts, Judge Wardlaw concluded that it was reasonable for the lower 
court to conclude that Bagdasarian “acted with the specific intent to 
threaten candidate Obama.”81 
V. OVERRULING THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT REQUIREMENT FOR 
TRUE THREATS 
The Ninth Circuit erred in assuming that a subjective intent 
analysis must be engrafted onto every “true threat” statute. The 
Supreme Court should overrule the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Bagdasarian, and resolve the circuit split created by that case by 
clarifying that Black does not require a subjective intent analyses for 
every true threat statute, and by clarifying that the rationale for not 
protecting true threats under the First Amendment only requires an 
objective intent analyses for determining a true threat. 
A. Virginia v. Black 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Black should not be interpreted 
as requiring a subjective intent inquiry for every true threat statute. 
The issue raised in Black was whether a Virginia statute containing a 
provision that treated any burning of a cross as “prima facie evidence 
of an intent to intimidate” violated the First Amendment.82 The 
Court found that while people frequently burn crosses for the 
purpose of intimidating others, there are also instances in which a 
cross might be burned for legitimate reasons, and therefore, the 
burning of a cross alone cannot be “prima facie evidence of an intent 
to intimidate” under the First Amendment.83 Black only engaged in 
a subjective intent analysis because the criminal statute at issue 
required subjective intent—not because the analysis was a 
constitutional requirement.84 Nowhere in Black did the court 
specifically hold that the First Amendment required a subjective 
analysis. 
Additionally, “Black did not criticize the existing case law,” 
which predominantly applied only the objective standard when 
 
 80. Id. at 1130.  
 81. Id. at 1131. 
 82. Black, 538 U.S. at 347–48. 
 83. Id. at 348. 
 84. People v. Lowery, 257 P.3d 72, 79 (Cal. 2011) (Baxter, J., concurring). 
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determining whether a statement was a true threat.85 Since Black was 
decided, the majority of courts addressing the issue have not 
engrafted a subjective intent analysis onto true threat statutes 
either.86 For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Porter v. 
Ascension Parish School Board, held: 
Speech is a “true threat” and therefore unprotected if an objectively 
reasonable person would interpret the speech as a “serious 
expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm.” The 
protected status of the threatening speech is not determined by 
whether the speaker had the subjective intent to carry out the 
threat . . . .87 
The decision of the Ninth Circuit to engraft a subjective intent 
analysis onto every true threat statue is therefore not justified by the 
Court’s opinion in Black or supported by other circuit courts.  
The Ninth Circuit was correct, however, in noting that under the 
court’s own precedent, Bagdasarian’s case required both a subjective 
and an objective analysis. The Ninth Circuit noted in Gordon that 
Congress “construe[d] ‘knowingly and willfully’ [in section 879] as 
requiring proof of a subjective intent to make a threat.”88 As a result 
of Congress’ express intent, the Ninth Circuit held in Gordon that 
the statute under which Bagdasarian was convicted required both a 
subjective and an objective analysis. However, the court went even 
further in Bagdasarian by holding that under Black, the First 
Amendment requires a subjective intent analysis for all true threat 
 
 85. Id. at 78–79 (citing Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th 
Cir. 2002)(“All the courts to have reached the issue have consistently adopted an objective test 
that focuses on whether a reasonable person would interpret the purported threat as a serious 
expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm.”); see also United States v. Malik, 16 
F.3d 45, 48 (2d. Cir. 1994); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Welch, 
745 F.2d 614, 619 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th 
Cir. 1973). 
 86. Lowery, 257 P.3d at 80; see also United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (“Statements constitute a ‘true threat’ if ‘an ordinary reasonable recipient who is 
familiar with the[ir] context . . . would interpret [those statements] as a threat of injury.’”); 
United States v. Jongewaard, 567 F.3d 336, 339 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009) (“In this circuit, the test 
for distinguishing a true threat from constitutionally protected speech is whether an objectively 
reasonable recipient would interpret the purported threat ‘as a serious expression of an intent 
to harm or cause injury to another.’”). 
 87. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 88. United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (citing 128 CONG. REC. 21, 218 
(1982)). 
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statutes regardless of whether the criminal statute contains a 
“knowingly and willfully” requirement.89 
B. Policies for Not Protecting True Threats Under the First 
Amendment 
In addition to the fact that Black simply does not hold that a 
subjective intent analysis is required for true threat statutes under the 
First Amendment, the rationale for excluding true threats from First 
Amendment protection does not indicate that subjective intent must 
be considered. Justice Sanford articulated why the government can 
legitimately proscribe certain forms of speech, such as speech 
threatening to harm political candidates. In Gitlow v. New York, he 
wrote: 
 [I]t is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom 
of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, 
does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without 
responsibility, whatever one may choose . . . . [A] State may punish 
utterances endangering the foundations of organized government 
and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. . . . In short this 
freedom does not deprive a State of the primary and essential right 
of self preservation . . . . [U]tterances advocating the overthrow of 
organized government by force, violence, and unlawful means, are 
so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of 
substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of [the 
state’s] police power.90 
Since our democratic society is based upon the election of 
citizens to provide government leadership, speech that specifically 
threatens to harm or assassinate political candidates chills the 
democratic process underlying our government. However, the court 
has also recognized that “debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”91 The tension created between the 
need to protect dissident political speech while maintaining a 
 
 89. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (2011). 
 90. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666–68 (1925).  
 91. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (internal quotation mark 
omitted) (reversing a conviction under a presidential threat statute because the defendant’s 
statements about taking the life of the President were conditional). 
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legitimate democratic process pulls at the very core of our American 
ideals. The practical result is that the First Amendment does not 
protect an individual’s right to say whatever he may desire. Even in 
the realm of political speech, where First Amendment rights are 
traditionally extremely robust, individuals do not have the right to 
threaten acts of violence on public officials. Robert Bork, one of the 
strongest advocates for free speech in the political realm observed: 
Speech advocating violent overthrow [of government] is . . . not 
‘political speech’ as that term must be defined by a Madisonian 
system of government. It is not political speech because it violates 
constitutional truths about processes and because it is not aimed at 
a new definition of political truth by a legislative majority. Violent 
overthrow of government breaks the premises of our system 
concerning the ways in which truth is defined, and yet those 
premises are the only reasons for protecting political speech.92 
Part of the rationale, therefore, in prohibiting “true threats” 
against a political candidate like Barack Obama, is that such threats 
undermine our democratic system of government. Although typically 
political speech can be robustly debated in the marketplace of ideas, 
there is no adequate response in the marketplace for threats of 
physical violence against a political candidate. As the Supreme Court 
stated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, such threats have “such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.”93 
Additionally, the harm created from such speech may be real 
whether or not the individual speaker intended his speech to be 
received as a threat, and regardless of whether the speaker actually 
intended to carry out such a threat. The Court recognized this in 
Black, stating that “a prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] 
individuals from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that 
fear engenders’ in addition to protecting people ‘from the possibility 
that the threatened violence will occur.’”94 Since fear and its 
disruptions can arise regardless of whether an individual intended to 
make a threat, a subjective intent analysis is not necessary for 
 
 92. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 31 (1971). 
 93. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 94. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 342, 360 (2003) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 388 (1992)). 
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determining whether society has a legitimate interest in prohibiting 
that speech. 
Finally, engrafting a subjective intent analysis onto every true 
threat statute reduces the likelihood that individuals making 
threatening statements will be convicted for their crime. 
Determining the subjective intent of an individual is much more 
onerous than determining whether an objective listener would 
interpret a message as a threat. If the purpose for criminalizing true 
threats is to protect others from fear of violence, then an objective 
intent analysis would presumably be an adequate inquiry for 
determining whether a statement is a true threat proscribable by the 
state.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in presuming that the 
First Amendment requires a subjective intent analysis to be engrafted 
on all true threat statutes. The Supreme Court should resolve the 
circuit split created by Bagdasarian and hold that while the First 
Amendment requires an objective analysis for determining a true 
threat, it does not require a subjective intent analysis to be engrafted 
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